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Russel Lawrence Barsh,
Michelle Fraser, Faye Morning Bull, Toby Provost
and Kirby Smith
Native American Studies
University ofLethbridge
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Abstract. Voting behavior in the three largest Aboriginal communities of
Alberta-Blood Tribe, Peigan Nation, and Four Nations-is contrasted with
non-Aboriginal voting behavior using polling-station counts from 16 gen-
eral elections and the 1992 constitutional referendum. Lower voter turn-
out and distinctive patterns of party preferences among Aboriginal voters
are examined more closely using data collected through standardized, open-
ended interviews conducted in conjunction with a voter mobilization ef-
fort on the Peigan Reserve in 1996. Although respondents did not report
refraining from participation in Federal or Provincial elections to avoid
compromising'their sovereignty-an argument sometimes made by national
Aboriginal organizations-the responses often exhibited pessimism or dis-
illusionment in other respects.
In the United States, citizenship and the Federal electoral franchise
were conferred generally on American Indians by law in 1924, largely as a
result of pressure brought by organizations of "progressive" Indians and
their friends (Barsh 1993). In Canada, legal obstacles to Aboriginal I peoples'
enjoyment of these basic rights were not removed until 1960, and polling
stations were not opened on Indian reserves until 1965.
A number of demographic factors predict a greater impact of the "In-
dian vote" in Canada than in American politics. Not only do Aboriginal
people comprise a larger portion of Canada's total population-roughly
three percent as compared to one-half of one percent-but they constitute a
majority throughout the northern half of the country (Barsh 1994:7-9). Ab-
original peoples dominate the political life of the Northwest Territories,
much of which is scheduled to emerge as a new, Inuit-majority province
called Nunanvut in 1999.
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Nearly half of Canada's Aboriginal people live in the three Prairie
provinces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta, where they are five per-
cent of total population and growing twice as fast as their neighbours. We
should also expect to find evidence of some Aboriginal influence in Prairie
politics-if not at the Federal level, then certainly in the Provinciallegisla-
tive assemblies, and strongest in more northerly ridings. This is not the
case, however. Voter turnouts among Indians on reserves2 have been low
(Barsh 1994:33-35; Gibbins 1991: 158-160). Few Aboriginal candidates
have been pre-selected, even in ridings which have relatively large Aborigi-
nal constituencies, and Aboriginal people continue to hold fewer than one
percent of the seats in Federal and Provincial legislatures. Only three won
seats in Parliament in the 1988 and 1993 national elections, two from the
Prairies and one (currently ajunior minister) from the Northwest Territories.
The Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing
(Milen 1991) focused its policy studies on two possible barri~rs to effective
Aboriginal participation in Canadian national elections: size of ridings and
campaign information. Serious attention was given to the establishment of
separate "Aboriginal Election Districts," on the model of New Zealand,
guaranteeing for Aboriginal people some minimum number of direct Parlia-
mentary representatives. This was also foreseen by the ill-fated 1992
Charlottetown constitutional accord, which, had it been approved by Cana-
dian voters, would have authorized negotiations leading to some kind of
direct Aboriginal representation in Parliament.
A number of other plausible explanations for the weak impact of Ab-
original peoples on Canadian elections have not been studied empirically.
They include possible deliberate efforts to exclude Aboriginal voters, such
as the gerrymandering of large Aboriginal constituencies, the incomplete
enumeration of eligible voters in Aboriginal communities, inaccessible sit-
ing of polling stations, and discrimination in the pre-selection of candi-
dates. They also include the possibility that Aboriginal people lack confi-
dence in the utility of voting-whether or not this belief is justified-or
abstain from broader Canadian political processes on ideological grounds.
This article addresses the factors of motivation and ideology by com-
paring the voting behavior of three of the largest Alberta Aboriginal com-
munities-Blood Tribe, Peigan Nation, and Four Nations-with their non-
Aboriginal neighbours using polling-station counts from 16 general elec-
tions and the 1992 constitutional referendum. Reasons for poor Aboriginal
voter turnouts and unfocussed voting patterns were explored through stan-
dardized interviews with approximately one-sixth of all eligible Peigan
voters, conducted by Peigan students as part of a voter-mobil,ization project.
The Prairie Indian Vote in Canadian Politics
Three Alberta Aboriginal Communities
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The Bloods and Peigans are two of the constituent nations of the
Blackfoot Confederacy and heirs to Treaty No.7 (1877), which led to the
establishment of Indian reserves in southwest Alberta. The Treaty was fol-
lowed in the region by a 30-year boom of coal-mining, railroad construction,
and the farming of grains and sugar beets. The Blood Reserve is Canada's
largest at 143,532 hectares, with several small town centers and a resident
population of more than 6,000. Its economy continues to be centered on
agriculture, with a patchwork of vast fields of canola and hay, largely leased
by the Blood Tribe to non-Indians, interrupted by hundreds of smaller In-
dian farms and ranches. The Tribal Administration's prestige project is a
massive irrigation lateral aimed at producing higher-value crops. Cardston,
seat of Canada's Mormon community, abuts the southern end of the reserve,
and Fort McLeod, originally a Royal Canadian Mounted Police (R.C.M.P.)
post and now little more than a tourist stopover, abuts the north. Lethbridge,
at 61,000 Alberta's third largest city, lies just east of reserve.
Just west of Fort McLeod, the Peigan Reserve is considerably smaller
in its territorial extent (45,591 hectares) and resident population (about
1,500). Ranches spread out from the only town, Brocket, which boasts a
gas-station, mini-mart, crafts store, and community administrative build-
ings. Pincher Creek, 15 km farther west, is the nearest full-service center for
Peigan residents and the last town on the Crowsnest Highway (Canada's
Route 3) before it ascends the Rocky Mountains. Although the Bloods and
Peigans share a common language, historical alliances, and Crown Treaty,
they remain proudly distinct culturally and as local governments. Their
interests occasionally conflict, moreover. Construction of the Oldman River
Dam by the Province of Alberta was beneficial to irrigated agriculture on
the Blood Reserve, for example, but was strongly opposed on cultural
grounds by many Peigans, and stands accused of exacerbating the severe
1995 floods that destroyed all Peigan Reserve riverbottom housing and
livestock.
The Cree Indian reserves in central Alberta, which identify themselves
collectively as the FourNations, differ markedly from the Bloods and Peigans,
with whom they engaged in a long, bitter territorial struggle until the end of
the last century. Battle Heights, a contemporary west Lethbridge neighbor-
hood, refers to one of the last major military engagements between the
Blackfoot Confederacy and the Crees. The four nations include the Mon-
tana, Samson, Louis Bull, and Ermineskin Reserves, also often known by
the name of the largest town center, Hobbema, which has been popularized
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(to the dismay of most Alberta Crees) by Canadian baseball novelist and
storyteller W. P. Kinsella. Signatories to Treaty No.6 (1876), the Four Na-
tions settled on a small block of contiguous reserves (30,110 hectares) bor-
dered by Wetaskiwin and Ponoka in a fertile grain-growing region 50 km
south of Edmonton. Oil, the principal motor of Alberta prosperity since the
Depression, was discovered under Four Nations territory in the 1960s. Boun-
tiful royalties, administered by the Federal Minister of Indian Affairs, have
paid for community centers, housing, per capita cash payments to adult
members, and trust funds for minors. Royalties also capitalized a Four Na-
tions bank (Peace Hills Trust), and a mining engineering company. The
Four Nations are now partners with the Denver-based Council of Energy
Resource Tribes (CERT) in international efforts to promote Indian rights
and development.
The three communities chosen for study therefore differ in a number of
respects which should influence their use of Provincial and Federal poli-
tics. The Bloods are large in numbers, while the Four Nations are compara-
tively wealthy, as well as numerous. The Peigans lack numbers or wealth.
Alberta Politics and Aboriginal Peoples
The Alberta political landscape does not seem to offer much fertile
ground for Aboriginal influences. From the 1880s to the 1920s, the stresses
of massive immigration made Anglocentrism and xenophobia regular fea-
tures of the province's political discourse (Palmer 1982). The Social Credit
Party owed its spectacular rise to power in 1935 to its attacks on banks and
wooing of working class voters; its leaders, William Aberhart and E. C.
Manning, were also charismatic radio evangelists who gave a millenial
Christian twist to the movement (Barr 1974:37-48, 152-54; Bell 1993:13-
16, 155; Pal 1992: 14). Although the Alberta party rejected the more viru-
lent anti-Semitic and anti-Catholic views of its British model, Major C. H.
Douglas (Barr 1974: 127-29; Bell 1993:49, 72), it grew increasingly conser-
vative and intolerant during 36 years of uninterrupted rule (Pal 1992: 16;
Macpherson 1962). In 1971, Albertans turned to Tory provincial-level lead-
ership under Peter Lougheed and Ralph Klein, and in 1993 launched the
Reform Party of Preston Manning, son of E. C. Manning, into Parliament.
Reform has opposed high rates of immigration and federalist compromises
with Quebec, and is perceived as more conscientiously Anglo-Christian
than the Tories.
Regional differences in Alberta politics should nevertheless be con-
sidered. Residents of the Alberta countryside usually have been and remain
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staunchly conservative in outlook, at various times voting heavily Tory,
Social Credit or Reform, but there also have been progressive countercur-
rents in the city of Edmonton and vicinity. In the 1993 Federal elections, for
example, the Reform Party swept 22 of 26 Alberta ridings, losing only
Edmonton to the Liberals. By comparison, southern Alberta has remained a
bedrock for conservative politicians and religious conservatism since the
1930s, when radical mining unions were broken by the collapse of the local
coal industry (Palmer 1982: 136). The neighbors of the Bloods and Peigans
are among the province's most conservative voters, then, while the Four
Nations border Alberta's main pocket of liberalism.
Alberta's conservative leadership has not so much targeted Aboriginal
peoples, as neglected them. Evidence of this appears poignantly in the
province's criminal justice and social welfare statistics: although not quite
three percent of the population, Alberta Indians are an estimated two-fifths
of inmates in Alberta prisons, and comprise nearly half of all dependent
children in the care of Alberta's provincial social-service agencies (Alberta
1991). If Ottawa continues on its present course of devolving financial
responsibility for social programs to the Provinces, moreover, it will be
more important than ever for Aboriginal people to have an effective voice
in Edmonton and other provincial capitols. While Aboriginal peoples have
been promised local self-government since 1983 (Cassidy and Bish
1989:16-24), there is not much likelihood that Ottawa will provide them
with additional financial resources to duplicate programs and services
which are currently offered by the Provinces.
Alberta Indian Leadership
There is little doubt that Canadian Indians generally, and Alberta Indi-
ans in particular, have had a significant impact on Federal Indian policies
since 1969 (Weaver 1981; Schwartz 1986). Indians persuaded the Liberal
Cabinet of Pierre Elliott Trudeau to shelve its proposals for promoting In-
dian assimilation, adopt a framework for the negotiation and settlement of
lingering land claims, and entrench "existing aboriginal and treaty rights"
in the Constitution Act, 1982, as a condition for breaking Canada's remain-
ing formal legal ties to the United Kingdom. Although the further clarifica-
tion of Aboriginal rights and self-government in the constitution foundered
in the 1980s, Brian Mulroney's Tories accelerated the pace of land claims
settlements, while launching negotiations with Indian communities on fis-
cal and administrative devolution. These programs, which continue un-
changed despite the election of a Liberal Parliament in 1993, have been
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criticized by national Aboriginal organizations as cynical attempts to side-
step the constitutional issues left unresolved a decade ago. Nevertheless, it
is significant that Ottawa mandarins exhibit a need to produce at least the
appearance of progress on Indian rights, and try to appease local Indian
leadership with cash from land claims and devolution agreements.
Indians' apparent political success at the Federal level, on the broad
outline of Indian policy, is arguably a function of two factors, contextual
and strategic. The willingness of successive Federal Governments to ac-
commodate Indians' political demands must be understood, first, in the con-
text of the national unity issue. The national Indian mobilization stimu-
lated by the release of the Trudeau Government's 1969 White Paper on
Indian policy coincided with the emergence of the FLQ, the extreme wing
of the separatist movement in Quebec. Since then, Federal strategies on
Aboriginal peoples and Quebec have been linked politically. Ottawa needs
the support of the West for any compromise with Quebec that involves rede-
signing Canadian federalism. The price for this support includes a wider
decentralization of the Canadian state, but Indians pose problems because
the constitution makes them a Federal responsibility. By promoting Indian
self-government, but (for the present) only as a kind of Provincial munici-
pality, Ottawa appeases Western Premiers without relinquishing its residual
leverage over them. Moreover, the Aboriginal question also is internal to
the Province of Quebec itself, and Ottawa has threatened to play this card if
the Part Quebecois wins some future referendum on independent sover-
eignty. Since recognizing Aboriginal rights serves Ottawa's federalist
agenda, it is not a true test of Aboriginal peoples' political power.
Progress at the level of national Indian policy was also won by means
of short bursts of intensely focussed activity in Ottawa and London, aimed
at publicly embarrassing Government, at home and abroad. The Constitu-
tional Express and the Aboriginal Embassy at London in 1981 concentrated
all available political energy on one goal: securing a guarantee of aboriginal
and treaty rights in the new, "repatriated" national constitution. Since then,
comparable levels of national Indian mobilization have only been possible
in response to a crisis such as the 1990 military confrontation with Mohawk
"Warriors" at Oka (Kahnasetake). Meanwhile, the organizational power of
national Aboriginal organizations has been eroded by Ottawa's decision to
negotiate non-constitutional matters at the local level, with the elected
councils of each individual Indian reserve. Their credibility has been un-
dermined, furthermore, by the overwhelmingly negative Indian vote on
the 1992 Charlottetown Constitutional Accord, despite provisions on self-
government that national Aboriginal leaders had painstakingly negotiated.
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It may therefore be predicted that Indian influence on Ottawa will fade,
unless there is a shift in Indian strategy from intensive single-issue public
confrontations to acquiring seats in the Federal and Provincial legislatures-
exactly the shift in strategy adopted by Quebec nationalists in 1993 when
they formed the Bloc Quebecois.
Canadian Indians seem preoccupied with problems of transition to
electoral politics within their own communities, however. The Indian Act,
1869 prescribed a uniform system of electing "chiefs" on Indian reserves,
and this approach was followed, substantially without change, in all subse-
quent Indian Acts (Daugherty & Madill 1980). Although individual Indian
councils may adopt by-laws for the regulation of elections, including the
adoption of putatively "customary" election procedures, the requirement
that officers be elected periodically by a record vote cannot be avoided.
Despite the apparent inconsistency of the ballot with traditional methods of
selecting leaders and holding them publicly accountable (e.g., Boldt &
Long 1984; Barsh 1986), there has been little comparative research on the
efficacy or influence of elected Indian officials (see, e.g., Cassidy and Bish
1989), and but two empirical studies of Indian elections in Canada (Haw-
thorn 1967:203; Long and Boldt 1987).
The Hawthorn (1967) report compiled historical election statistics for
34 Indian "bands" across Canada, finding relatively low voter turnouts
(57%, on average), low numbers of competitors for each available post (no
more than two), and low rates of turnover (46% of the incumbents were re-
elected). However, speculations as to the significance of this pattern were
not based on comparisons with non-Indian communities or on qualitative
fieldwork. Hawthorn's descriptive statistics are of limited utility today, fur-
thermore, because the period of study preceded substantial increases in the
financial resources of Indian councils, and therefore their power to impact
Indians' lives, which took place after 1973.
Long and Boldt (1987) used election statistics and interviews with
elected officials to compare the leadership selection process on the Blood
and Peigan Reserves with those of the adjacent municipalities of Cardston,
Fort McLeod, and Pincher Creek, which are of roughly the same size and
economic base. Their study also extended more than a decade into the post-
1973 period of relative fiscal prosperity and power that should, intuitively,
have increased the relevance of "band" elections to Indian communities.
Greater relevance of elections and heightened political competitiveness is
suggested by Long and Boldt's data. On average, no more than two candi-
dates contested municipal council seats, whereas the average number of
competitors for each Indian "band council" seat was from two to four times
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greater.3 In municipal elections, moreover, the successful candidate won 60
to 80% of the total vote, while on the two reserves, the successful candidate
won only 20 to 50% of the total vote. Long and Boldt propose kinship as
one explanation for this pattern: consistent with traditional Blackfoot po-
litical values, every large family or clan usually sponsors a candidate to
represent its own interests. A second possibility, originally raised by Haw-
thorn, involves the magnitude of the potential spoils. The Bloods have a
much larger budget to fight over than the Peigans, and, arguably as a conse-
quence, more hotly contested elections.
The Long and Boldt (1987) findings provide a point of departure for
the present study. The financial resources and powers of Indian govern-
ments are derived from Federal laws, as well as Federal and Provincial
programs and transfer payments. To what extent do Indian voters conceive
of Federal and Provincial elections as useful means for asserting and pro-
tecting their claims to external resources? To what extent do they expect
their own, internally-elected leaders to suffice as external advocates? Do
they regard differences in local, Provincial, and Federal electoral politics as
quantitative in nature (i.e., electoral quotients), or qualitative?
Data on Indian Participation
Tables 1-7 compare voter turnouts and distributions of votes cast at
on-reserve polling stations, with the total votes of the electoral divisions in
which each reserve was located. Election results were averaged for the time
periods before and after 1980, to simplify visual comparison of trends. Four
main trends appear unambiguously in the data.
Indian participation has been poor and continues to decline. Voter
participation generally has fallen slightly since 1965, but Indian voter par-
ticipation has fallen much faster. Among Bloods, for example, voter turnout
in Provincial elections was 44% of voter turnout for the riding as a whole
before 1980, and this ratio fell to 20% for the period after 1980 (Table 1). In
the case of Four Nations, the ratio of reserve to riding turnouts in Provincial
elections fell from 51 % to 19% (Table 3). As a consequence, the Indian vote
has had considerably less impact on total votes cast than would be possible
if all eligible reserve Indians had voted (Table 8).
Participation in Federal elections remains somewhat greater. Although
Four Nations voter turnout in Provincial elections fell from 51 % to 19% of
the level of voter turnout for the riding as a whole, Four Nations turnout in
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TABLE 1
BLOOD TRIBE PARTICIPATION IN PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS
Avera e voter turnout and results, 1967-1975 ( ercent)
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Voter Turnout Distribution of the vote:
Tory Liberal NDP SoCred
Division
Bloods
59.2
26.2
47.8
83.8
1.6
2.4
46.4
12.4
Average voter turnout and results, 1982-1993 (percent)
Voter Turnout Distribution of the vote (note A):
Tory Liberal NDP WCC
Division
Bloods
55.6
11.3
65.9
45.6
21.2
7.8
6.8
26.1
9.2
6.5
Note A. In 1986 an Independent, Steve Pinchak, won 56.1 % ofthe Blood Reserve vote,
and 31.0% of the total vote in this riding.
TABLE 2
PEIGAN NATION PARTICIPATION IN PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS
Avera e voter turnout and results, 1967-1975 ercent
Voter Turnout Distribution of the vote:
Tory Liberal NDP SoCred
Division
Peigans
71.0
44.5
55.4
77.2
2.3
2.3
7.0
9.1
35.3
11.4
Average voter turnout and results, 1982-1993 (percent)
Voter Turnout Distribution of the vote:
Tory Liberal NDP WCC
Division
Peigans
63.3
16.7
62.7
50.0
13.6
10.7
11.8
26.9
3.8
8.3
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TABLE 3
FOUR NATIONS PARTICIPATION IN PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS
Average voter turnout and results, 1967-1975 (percent)
Voter Turnout Distribution of the vote (note B):
Tory Liberal NDP SoCred
Division 65.5 41.9 2.5 15.8 39.7
4Nations 33.4 58.6 6.0 21.4 9.5
Average voter turnout and results, 1982-1993 (percent)
Voter Turnout Distribution of the vote:
Tory Liberal NDP WCC
Division 58.9 59.2 9.7 16.4 11.4
4Nations 11.1 28.6 29.2 16.0 19.5
Note B. The Four Nations reserves were split between two divisions (Wetaskiwin and
Ponoka) through 1975; they are combined here.
TABLE 4
BLOOD TRIBE PARTICIPATION IN FEDERAL ELECTIONS
Average voter turnout and results, 1965-1979 (percent)
Voter Turnout Distribution of the vote:
Tory Liberal NDP SoCred
Division
Bloods
72.2
27.8
55.1
76.5
22.5
19.3
9.4
3.4
12.3
1.3
Average voter turnout and results, 1980-1993 (percent)
Voter Turnout Distribution of the vote (note C):
Tory Liberal NDP Reform
Division
Bloods
66.7
20.8
52.4
48.2
18.2
28.2
9.3
14.0
14.8
3.6
Note C. The Reform Party swept the 1993 election in this riding with 52.6% of the total
vote, although 58.0% of the Bloods voted Liberal.
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TABLE 5
PEIGAN NATION PARTICIPATION IN FEDERALELECTIONS
Avera e voter turnout and results, 1965-1979 ( ercent)
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Voter Turnout Distribution of the vote:
Tory Liberal NDP SoCred
Division
Peigans
72.5
42.3
55.8
74.1
21.8
18.3
9.4
3.2
12.4
3.3
Average voter turnout and results, 1980-1993 (percent)
Voter Turnout Distribution of the vote (note D):
Tory Liberal NDP Reform
Division
Peigans
68.8
23.4
50.9
35.9
13.6
33.2
8.3
17.4
23.6
3.8
Note D. The Reform Party swept the 1993 election in this division with 63.3% of the
total vote, but 84.0% of the Peigans voted Liberal.
TABLE 6
FOUR NATIONS PARTICIPATION IN FEDERAL ELECTIONS
Average voter turnout and results, 1965-1979 (percent)
Voter Turnout Distribution of the vote:
Tory Liberal NDP SoCred
Division
4Nations
71.9
31.5
63.7
72.6
15.8
16.8
11.5
6.2
8.5
3.2
Average voter turnout and results, 1980-1993 (percent)
Voter Turnout Distribution of the vote:
Tory Liberal NDP Reform
Division
4Nations
68.0
22.5
52.7
56.7
11.8
26.7
10.4
10.3
20.5
3.8
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TABLE 7
REFERENDUM PARTICIPATION AND RESULTS (1992)
%VOTING YES (%) NO(%)
Lethbridge Total 71.7 39.1 60.9
Blood Reserve 11.8 30.2 69.8
McLeod Total 77.0 35.4 64.6
Peigan Reserve 18.4 31.6 68.4
Wetaskiwin Total 71.0 28.3 71.7
Four Nations 3.1 25.0 75.0
TABLE 8
ACTUALAND POTENTIAL VOTING POWER OF RESERVES
Average voter turnout (1965-1993)
Reserve Indians
who voted (P/F)
Percent of total riding vote:
Blood Reserve
Peigan Reserve
Four Nations
250/373
132/199
243/395
Provincial
5.0
2.0
2.2
Federal
1.1
0.6
1.2
Potential voter turnout (1986)
Eligible Indian
adults (estimated)
Percent of total riding list:
Provincial Federal
Blood Reserve 2993 31.0 4.3
Peigan Reserve 851 7.3 1.2
Four Nations 2096 17.0 3.3
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Federal elections fell less, from 44 % to 33% (Table 6). During the same
period, the ratio of voter turnout in Federal elections, to turnout in Provincial
elections, rose from 0.94 to 2.03 for Four Nations polls. A change of similar
, magnitude occurred among the Bloods and Peigans. For the ridings as a
whole, however, voters continued to participate at roughly equal levels in
Federal and Provincial elections.
Indian voters have been moving to the Left relative to their neighbors.
At the Provincial level, all of the ridings analysed have largely shifted their
support from Social Credit to the Tories, with some small secondary ben-
efits for the Liberals. The Indian vote, by contrast, has begun shifting from
Tory to Liberal in the north, and from Tory to NDP in the south (Tables 1-3).
At the Federal level there have been parallel changes. In general, Reform
has attracted voters from the Social Credit, Liberal, and Tory camps. Among
Indian voters, however, the trend has been to abandon the Tory camp in
favor of the Liberals and, to a lesser extent, the NDP (Tables 4-6). Taken as
a whole, then, Indians in these ridings are leaving the Tories to move farther
Left, while their neighbours are either reinforcing the Tories or moving
even farther to the Right.
Indian candidates, although rarely pre-selected, can improve Indian
participation. Only three Indian candidates have stood in the elections
summarized in Tables 1-7. A Blood, Jim Gladstone, stood as a Liberal in the
1979 Federal election; although voter turnout on the Blood Reserve was
only average (21.7%), it was more Liberal (31.4%) than in any other elec-
tion before or since (Table 4). In 1988, Willie Littlechild, a Four Nations
lawyer, won a seat in Parliament as a Tory. Four Nations turnout was both
exceptionally high (48.5%) and unequivocally Tory (91.3%); Tory support
in the riding as a whole weakened, however, as a result of defections to the
Reform Party (Table 6). On the Provincial level, another Four Nations Cree,
Mel Buffalo, unsuccessfully sought a seat in the Legislative Assembly in
1986 as a Liberal. Four Nations voter turnout was poor (4.7%), but more
Liberal (54.1 %) than in any other election since 1960.
Taken together, the foregoing observations indicate a loss of confi-
dence in Federal elections, and an even greater loss of confidence in Pro-
vincial elections, as well as a growing degree of party polarization of Indian
and non-Indian electors in Southern Alberta. To the extent that the Tories
and Liberals have experimented with local Indian candidates, they have
strengthened their Indian support-at least among the Four Nations. This
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may reflect the relative wealth of the Crees, and their ability to circulate
information in support of an Indian candidate. It may also suggest that one
of the factors affecting the pre-selection of Indian candidates is the relative
wealth of reserves, and their degree of economic integration into the larger
economic community.
The results of the 1992 constitutional referendum (Table 7) deserve
special attention. Indian voter turnouts were unusually weak, notwithstand-
ing the fact that Indian self-government was a significant element of the
constitutional accord being tested by the vote. On all three reserves, more-
over, the vote was slightly more negative in comparison with electoral divi-
sion totals. This result is consistent with the overwhelmingly negative opin-
ion of the constitutional accord expressed publicly by Alberta's elected
Indian leaders at the time. Unlike legislative elections, which elected In-
dian leaders have generally ignored, the referendum was the subject of in-
tense interest and organized opposition on most Alberta reserves. Indian
leaders' opposition arguably had mostly a negative effeCt: Alberta Indians
stayed away from the polls.
Status and Trends in Voting Power
It would appear that Indian leaders have underestimated the potential
power of an organized voting strategy, at least at the Provincial political
level. The number of eligible adults on the Blood Reserve is impressive,
and probably sufficient to determine whether a Tory or Liberal is returned
to the Legislative Assembly from the Cardston riding (compare Table 1 and
Table 8). Although the Four Nations hold a smaller potential share of total
voting power in the Ponoka riding, it is enough to deprive the Tories of a
50% majority-merely symbolic, perhaps, but probably an adequate reason
for the Tories to consider the pre-selection of an Indian candidate (compare
Table 3 and Table 8). Even Peigan, with less than one-tenth of the voting
power in the McLeod riding, has some basis for influencing the pre-selec-
tion and platform decisions of the local riding association-if they can
plausibly deliver their votes to a single candidate.
Table 8 was calculated from Department of Indian Affairs and Northern
Development (Canada: DIAND 1987) reports of total membership and on-
reserve populations in 1986. The number of resident adults 18 years or
older was estimated by using the age structure of status Indians in 1986
(Loh 1990). Estimates of Peigan and Four Nations resident adults are con-
sistent with the numbers reported on 1986 Federal and Provincial voting
lists. The estimate for the Blood Reserve is 40% above 1986 electoral enu-
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merations, however, which may indicate a considerable under-enumeration
by electoral officials. 4 Indian reserve population figures in the 1991 census
may be even less reliable because of a widespread Indian boycott of the
enumeration.
In any event, the populations of Alberta Indian reserves are relatively
young, and still growing faster than their neighbors. This will tend to in-
crease the Indian share of the electorate to levels somewhat greater than
those shown in Table 8. There will likely continue to be a trend towards
Indians living and working off-reserve. In 1986, 19% of Bloods resided off-
reserve, compared to 26% of Peigans and 41 % of Four Nations Crees. If the
inadequacy of housing and employment on reserves continues to fuel this
trend, it will offset reserve population growth, in which case potential re-
serve Indian voting power may even fall below the levels shown in Table 8.
Another factor affecting the potential future voting power of Indian
reserves will obviously be electoral boundary changes. The Four Nations
were split between two Provincial ridings until 1982, dividing their vote
roughly 70-30. The Blood Reserve was divided between two provincial
ridings until 1971 (Alberta 1983:106), although it appears that all Indian
reserve residents were actually polled together without regard to the offi-
cial map. The Peigan Reserve has remained intact in a single Provincial
riding, but its boundaries were redrawn in 1993. Originally, the riding was
mainly comprised of farm towns east of the Reserve; now, it lies mostly west
of the Reserve, incorporating the mining towns in Crowsnest Pass. As a
result, the riding has become somewhat more Liberal. On the Federal level,
Peigan was attached to the McLeod Division in 1965, moved to Lethbridge
Division from 1968 to 1988, and returned to a redrawn McLeod Division in
1993. The McLeod riding was somewhat more conservative (Tory and Re-
form) in 1993 than Lethbridge.
The 1996 Peigan Voter Study
Whatever the actual present and future potential for Indian voting
power in Alberta, it would seem that most Bloods, Peigans and Four Nations
Crees consider Federal and Provincial elections inconvenient, irrelevant,
or inaccessible. To understand better the subjective reasons for poor partici-
pation, we took advantage of an invitation to assist the development of
voter mobilization programs on the Peigan Reserve. During the first three
months of 1996, three Peigan university students conducted a standard-
ized, house-to-house interview with 99 eligible voters on the reserve.5
Interviewees were asked to compare their rate of participation in Band,
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Provincial, and Federal elections; identify their reasons for participating (or
not participating) in elections at each of these levels; and explain their
agreement or disagreement with a series of "statements" about electoral
politics and politicians. The responses are summarized in Tables 9-12.6
TABLE 9
PEIGANS' SELF-REPORTED ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION (1996)
Percent of respondents answering 8-10 where 10 is "always vote"
Total sample By gender: By age:
Male Female 18-39 40+
Federal (N=9l) 23.1 27.9 18.8 24.4 27.8
Alberta (N=90) 21.1 25.6 17.0 18.5 25.0
Band (N=97) 70.1 77.1 63.3 58.3 89.2
TABLE 10
PEIGANS'SELF-ASSESSEDELECTORALINFLUENCE(1996)
Percent answering 8-10 where 10 is "decisive" ACTUAL influence
Total sample By gender: By age:
Male Female 18-39 40+
Federal (N=88) 8.0 7.1 8.7 9.4 5.7
Alberta (N=89) 7.9 4.6 10.9 7.4 8.6
Band (N=96) 62.5 65.2 60.0 70.7 50.0
Percent answering 8-10 where 10 is "decisive" POTENTIAL influence
Total sample By gender: By age:
Male Female 18-39 40+
Federal (N=87) 24.1 19.0 28.9 22.6 26.5
Alberta (N=88) 23.9 16.7 30.4 22.2 26.5
Band (N=97) 80.4 70.8 89.8 83.1 76.3
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TABLE 11
IMPORTANCE OF ELECTIONS TO PEIGAN FAMILIES (1996)
Percent of respondents answering 8-10 where 10 is "very much"
Total sample By gender: By age:
Male Female 18-39 40+
Federal (N=89) 42.7 52.4 34.0 36.4 52.9
Alberta (N=88) 34.1 41.5 27.7 27.3 45.5
Band (N=98) 58.2 56.2 60.0 56.7 60.5
TABLE 12
PEIGAN POLITICAL BELIEFS AND VOTING BEHAVIOR (1996)
Percent answering 8-10 where 10 is "strongly agree"
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Total By gender: By age:
sample Male Female 18-39 40+
Politicians biased (N=95) 34.7 35.4 33.3 35.1 33.3
Politicians heed money (N=97) 58.6 63.3 54.0 56.7 61.5
Parties are all alike (N=97) 37.1 36.2 38.0 32.8 43.6
Voting is alien process (N=99) 33.0 34.0 32.0 29.3 38.5
Our community is first (N=97) 45.4 38.3 52.0 41.4 51.3
Electoral participation. The proportion of respondents who reported
voting regularly in Federal and Provincial elections was roughly equal to
the rates derived from polling station returns (compare Table 9 with Tables
2 and 5). Not surprisingly, voting in Band elections was reportedly more
than three times greater-four times greater among older respondents. At all
three levels, men reported somewhat more frequent voting activity than
women.
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Perceived actual and potential electoral influence. It is also not sur-
prising that our respondents believe that they have considerably greater
influence on Band elections, than elections at the Federal or Provincial
levels (Table 10). Indeed, nearly half (48.3%) felt that they have "zero"
impact on Federal elections, and nearly as many (41.6%) felt that they have
no impact on Provincial elections, compared with 11.5% who were as pro-
foundly cynical about their impact on Band elections. Many of our respon-
dents were optimistic about exercising greater electoral power in the future
at all political levels, especially women. Confidence in the potential for
influencing Band politics was still much greater than confidence in having
decisive effects on off-reserve politics, especially among younger Peigans.
Significance ofelectoral outcomes. Low participation does not neces-
sarily reflect a lack of appreciation of the impacts of Federal and Provincial
politics on Peigans. Although Band-level elections are perceived as having
the greatest effect on Peigans, Federal elections do not lag far behind, espe-
cially amongst men and older respondents (Table 11). When asked why
elections were important, the most frequent answer was program funding
(Federal 63.5%, Provincial 76.2%, Band 37.9%). Many respondents also
referred to the role of governments as defenders-or usurpers-of Native
rights (Federal 30.2%, Provincial 19.0%, Band 10.3%). Just over half the
respondents associated Band-level politics with "our future" or "commu-
nity," however, without further specification.7
Reasons for non-participation. To explore possible reasons for non-
participation, we asked the respondents how strongly they agreed or dis-
agreed with five statements about political process (Table 12).8 On the
whole, their responses were pessimistic. A majority agreed strongly that
money dominates politics, and this goes a long way explaining the basis of
perceived powerlessness. One-third agreed strongly that white politicians
are prejudiced, and that political parties differ only in name. Women and
older respondents tended to have doubts about the cultural propriety of
voting in non-Native elections, and voting generally, moreover.
One factor that does not seem to be strongly implicated is the Peigan
share of the electorate. Nearly half (43.7%) the respondents overestimated
the proportion of Peigan eligible voters in their Federal riding, by at least
500%. While 46.7% underestimated Peigan electoral strength by half or
more at the Provincial level, moreover, another 32.0% of respondents over-
estimated the Peigan share of their Provincial riding by at least 50% (com-
pare Table 8). Furthermore, when asked if comprising one-tenth of a
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Provincial riding makes any difference, 40.7% of respondents replied nega-
tively.
Means of increasing electoral power. Respondents were also asked
open-ended questions about ways of persuading more Peigans to vote, and
making elections at all levels fairer. Exactly half of the respondents' sug-
gestions for increasing election turnouts involved public information and
education; when asked what kinds of information would be most useful,
77.1 % of respondents referred to party platforms, election issues, and the
benefits of electoral participation for the Peigan people. One-fourth of the
respondents felt that personal contact with the candidates would motivate
voters, but only one-tenth suggested the need for Native candidates. More
information and personal contact also accounted for 37.1 % of the sugges-
tions for making elections fairer. Significantly, however, 45.2% of the re-
spondents felt that the problems with contemporary politics are more fun-
damental, and require structural changes, e.g., in how candidates are re-
cruited and pre-selected, how the party system operates, and how leaders are
held publicly accountable.
Conclusions
Three principal intepretive themes emerge from the interview data.
Feelings of exclusion. On the whole, respondents take a dim view of
the integrity of politicians at all levels, and believe that non-Aboriginal
politicians are prone to disregard Indians on account of their race, or be-
cause they are poor (Table 12). This explains why respondents tended to
feel that they have relatively little impact on Federal and Provincial elec-
tions, although they overestimated their numerical power in local ridings.
Lack ofpractical and strategic information. Interviewers were frequently
asked basic questions about getting on electoral lists, obtaining campaign
information, and locating respondents' riding associations. Information was
evidently a major factor affecting many respondents' pessimism about increas-
ing the voting impact of Peigans at the Provincial and Federal levels.
Political optimism, age, and gender. Womentended to believe more in
the potential power of Peigan voters, but vote less often themselves at the
Federal and Provincial levels (Table 9). Women also expressed greater mis-
givings about elections generally and off-reserve elections in particular
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(Table 12). Young people are relatively optimistic about influencing the
Band council, but tend not to vote as often in Band elections.
One explanation did not emerge. No respondents argued that Aborigi-
nal peoples must refrain from participating in Federal or Provincial elec-
tions because to do so would compromise their sovereignty-an argument
frequently made by national Aboriginal organizations and scholars. Our
respondents generally took a rather pragmatic view; if they avoided the
polls, it was mainly because they did not conceive that voting would be
useful. Most of the responses revealed an implicit hierarchy, however, in
which participating in Federal elections is more important than participat-
ing at the Provincial level. This is consistent with Peigan voting history
(Tables 2 and 5), but inconsistent with respondents' awareness of the con-
crete effects of Provincial agencies and programs on their lives (Table 11).
Preference for Federal politics may reflect a presumption that "the Crown,"
in treaty terms, is associated with Ottawa, and it is Ottawa that should take
primary responsibility for Peigan well-being.
In brief, interview results suggest that greater information about the
practical and strategic aspects of voting would improve Peigan participa-
tion. A large proportion of Peigans might remain convinced of the futility of
voting, however.
This sense of futility arises, in part, from the experience of
marginalization. All contemporary Alberta voters are somewhat alienated,
but Aboriginal voters have the least concrete evidence that their Federal or
Provincial votes count. Aboriginal voters may be disillusioned even further
by their own internal politics, like the two-fifths of our respondents who did
not feel that they have decisive control of their own Band council (Table
10). The best antidote for feelings of futility is concrete success: for ex-
ample, defeating a hostile candidate, or helping elect a sympathetic one.
The 1988 Federal election victory of Willie Littlechild was an oppor-
tunity to bolster Aboriginal Albertans' confidence in the value of their vote.
As one of the first Indian rights activists to be sent to Parliament by a heavily
Indian riding, Uttlechild anticipated a seat on the front benches. Five years
later, still a back-bencher, exhausted, recovering from a heart attack and not
convinced that any further separation from his family would serve the inter-
ests of his community, he declined to stand for election again. His party's
leadership did not send a positive signal to the Four Nations.
Optimists will point to the dramatic, nationally-publicized success of
Manitoba Cree MLA Elijah Harper in blocking Manitoba's approval of the
1989 Meech Lake Constitutional Accord; or to the fact that an Aboriginal
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MP from the Northwest Territories, Ethel Blondin, is a junior minister in
the Chretien Government with the disposition of hundreds of millions of
dollars of program funding for youth services. People who believe they are
powerless demand more palpable, personal evidence that they are in error,
however. Demonstrations of potential voting power will probably need to
be organized within each Aboriginal community-if people are willing to
gamble their time and effort on such experiments.
None of our respondents mentioned the possibility of forming tactical
political alliances with non-Aboriginal groups, implying a belief that
Peigan interests inescapably conflict with those of their neighbors. On the
other hand, one-tenth of our respondents suggested that mobilizing Peigan
voters, and influencing Federal and Provincial officials, is the job of the
elected Peigan chief and council. These views promote self-isolation and
rationalize powerlessness, and they must be overcome before the people
hazard any experiments in asserting themselves outside of their reserve. We
suspect that this is not a challenge unique to the Peigans.
Notes
I. The term "Aboriginal" as used in the Constitution Act, 1982, section
35, recognizes the distinct "aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal
peoples of Canada," which include Indians, Metis, and Inuit. This study is
limited to "Indians" on Indian reserves as defined in the Indian Act, 1985,
but refers to them generally as individual "First Nations."
2. For reasons explained by Gibbins (1991: 158), it is not possible to
assess with any reliability the number of Aboriginal people casting ballots
at off-reserve polling stations.
3. The Bloods were included in Hawthorn's study, and already evidenced
a tendency towards large numbers of candidates per post (4.7 on average;
Hawthorn 1967:205). By the 1980s, this number had nearly doubled.
4. The number of Indian reserve residents reported on voting lists has
varied considerably between elections, often by as much as 50%, suggest-
ing a significant problem with enumeration methods.
5. Interviewers were two men, one of whom had served a term on the
Band council, and a politically-active woman. There were differences in
responses between interviewers, but only one was significant: the subjects
interviewed by the former councilman reported higher rates of electoral
participation at all levels. Interviews were mainly conducted in English, but
were explained in Blackfoot whenever necessary.
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6. Since responses to our Lickert-type scales were strongly bimodal,
calculating means or medians would have been misleading; instead, Tables
9-12 indicate the frequency of high-end responses defined as 8-10 on a 10-
point scale.
7. This question was open-ended and the responses were later grouped
into broad categories before coding. Since interviewers were instructed to
probe for specificity, vague responses reflect either respondents' uncertainty
or their reluctance to speak more freely-particularly to kinfolk, however
distantly related.
8. In the order that they appear in Table 12: "Whatever they say in pub-
lic, most white politicians are just prejudiced"; "Politicians just listen to
money"; "It doesn't matter which political party you vote for, because
they're really all the same"; "Voting is a whiteman's way of doing things,
it's not right for us"; "White peoples' politics is just not our business-our
own community comes first." A pretest with 25 respondents was used to
choose clear statements that evoked strong responses.
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